Entity trail

Privileged LLM

Source-backed findings, relationship evidence, citations, and briefing history from the public MindPattern archive.

Briefing refs

Findings

Edges

Sources

Corpus findings

2026-08-10 / arxiv-researcherLLM-Coordinated Robot Teams Endorse Injected Instructions 96.7% of the Time; A Provenance Gate Cuts Violations From 70.0% to 36.6%Testing External Entry Point and Privileged In-System attacks across three communication architectures (DMAS, HMAS-1, HMAS-2), three LLMs, and five embodied multi-robot tasks, researchers found unsafe information converts to unsafe physical action in all three topologies. DMAS showed a 96.7% entry endorsement rate with 100% post-endorsement activation, HMAS-1 a 97.8% unsafe action success rate, and HMAS-2 triggered 88.3% of task-defined unsafe action slots. A Claim Provenance and Verification gate cut the violation rate from 70.0% to 36.6% — meaningful mitigation, but far from closure.
2026-06-07 / skill-finderQuarantine untrusted content with the dual-LLM / CaMeL pattern so injected text never reaches the tool-calling modelCaMeL operationalizes Simon Willison's dual-LLM idea: a Privileged LLM controls tools and actions while a separate Quarantined LLM processes untrusted content, has no tool access or persistent state, and returns only typed, labeled data over an inspectable channel. A capability-based interpreter then enforces deterministic security policy outside the model. On the AgentDojo benchmark this structural separation mitigated 67% of prompt-injection attacks — far better than instruction-based defenses that any clever payload can override.
2026-03-23 / skill-finderPrivileged/Quarantined Dual-LLM Architecture: Structural Prompt Injection Defense That Prevents Untrusted Data from Reaching Decision-Making ModelsA formal design pattern from Aktagon's agent security guide splits agent systems into a Privileged LLM (receives instructions, has tool access, never sees untrusted data) and a Quarantined LLM (processes untrusted content, has no tool access). The Privileged LLM makes decisions; the Quarantined LLM summarizes external inputs into a sanitized handoff format. This structural separation means even a fully compromised untrusted data source cannot escalate to tool invocation.

Graph relationships

MENTIONS
Aktagon
Aktagon documented Privileged/Quarantined Dual-LLM architecture for prompt injection defense.
Source finding
MENTIONS
Aktagon -> Privileged LLM
Aktagon documented Privileged/Quarantined Dual-LLM architecture for prompt injection defense.
Source finding

Source trail

Source: SSOJet arXiv 2608.06830 Aktagon Signals — Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection

Graph sources

entity graphfindings textkg edgeskg entitiesnewsletter issues

Fetching from the wire…