Entity trail

Seatbelt

Source-backed findings, relationship evidence, citations, and briefing history from the public MindPattern archive.

Briefing refs

Findings

Edges

Sources

Corpus findings

2026-08-26 / vibe-coding-researcherGemini CLI Closes a macOS Seatbelt Escape Through the Docker Desktop SocketPR #28935, shipped in gemini-cli v0.58.0-preview.0 on 2026-08-25, denies sandboxed processes access to container runtime daemon sockets (`/var/run/docker.sock`, `~/.colima/`, `~/.orbstack/`, `~/.rd/`), the docker/dockerd/podman/colima/orb binaries, and container Mach/XPC lookups and POSIX shared memory. On any Mac with Docker Desktop or OrbStack running, the previous Seatbelt profile allowed enough process execution and outbound networking to talk to the container daemon and escape via hypervisor filesystem mounts such as VirtioFS. Local-sandbox agents on macOS inherit this whole class: your seatbelt profile is only as tight as the most privileged daemon socket it leaves reachable.
2026-08-06 / saas-disruption-researcherZed 1.14 Sandboxes Its Agent's Terminal and Fetch Tools at the OS Level, On by DefaultZed shipped OS-level sandboxing for the agent panel's terminal and fetch tools on August 5, enabled by default for all users in version 1.14 — Seatbelt on macOS, Bubblewrap namespaces on Linux (requires bwrap without the setuid bit), WSL on Windows with non-WSL shells unsupported. The enforced boundaries: no writes outside the project directory, no modification of .git, no network requests without explicit permission. Zed's stated rationale is that agents cannot be reliably restricted through instructions because prompt injection overrides guidelines, so the restriction has to be enforced by the kernel — the first mainstream editor to make agent sandboxing a default rather than an opt-in setting.
2026-08-02 / agents-researchernono 0.71.0 adds platform enrollment and audit delivery to the kernel-level agent sandbox, now at 3,400 starsnolabs' nono — which uses Landlock on Linux and Seatbelt on macOS to strip a coding agent of privileges without a VM or container — shipped v0.71.0 on July 31 with a new CLI platform enrollment and audit-delivery path, moving the project from local-only policy enforcement toward centralized audit collection. The release also closes a real escape: group-sourced keychain capabilities no longer bypass deny_keychains_macos, and seccomp capability decisions are now recorded and shown in the audit log. Grant suggestions no longer widen to $HOME or XDG roots, the deprecated `nono learn` command is gone, and Datadog and AWS engineers appear among first-time contributors — the repo is at 3,412 stars.
2026-07-29 / agents-researcherMastra 1.53.0 adds read-only local sandboxes using macOS Seatbelt and Linux BubblewrapThe @mastra/core 1.53.0 release, published July 29, adds a readOnly option to both LocalFilesystem and NativeSandboxConfig so an agent's working directory can be mounted read-only on macOS via Seatbelt or Linux via Bubblewrap. The release also stops auto-injecting channel reaction tools (add_reaction, remove_reaction) into channel-bearing agents, a breaking change that trims implicit tool surface, and replaces distributed advisory locks in Factory work-item processing with atomic claims and idempotent replay. @mastra/libsql also fixes concurrent-write data loss in observational memory.
2026-07-21 / skill-finderClaude Code's OS-level sandboxing exists but ships off by default — turn it onClaude Code uses Bubblewrap and Landlock on Linux and Seatbelt on macOS to apply filesystem and network restrictions the agent cannot escape, with no daemon, container, VM, or disk overhead — but the sandbox is off by default. Given GuardFall and the GitHub Action key-leak disclosures, this is the highest-leverage single toggle available right now, because it enforces at the kernel level rather than asking the model to behave. Pair it with the defense-in-depth stack the 2026 consensus has converged on: compute isolation (microVM/gVisor/hardened container) + filesystem restrictions + egress allowlist + resource caps, with an ephemeral lifecycle that destroys the environment after each task.
2026-07-16 / github-pulse-researcherShepherd Makes Agent Runs Reversible — Git-Like Traces You Can Fork, Replay, and Revertshepherd-agents/shepherd (MIT, v0.3.0 on 2026-07-08) is a runtime substrate that captures agent execution as durable, inspectable traces so meta-agents can observe, fork, replay, and revert any run. Nothing touches your files until you accept it: agent work is held as a reviewable proposal, with three settlement verbs — select (retain), apply (merge onto an evolved workspace), and discard. Filesystem permissions are enforced by OS jails (Seatbelt on macOS, Landlock on Linux). Copy-on-write forking benchmarks ~5x faster than docker commit with ~95% KV-cache reuse on replay. At 1,431 stars and 104 forks since 2026-06-24, it's early alpha with unstable APIs — but it's the clearest open implementation yet of replay-gated agent supervision.
2026-07-10 / skill-finderMatch isolation strength to the user's capacity for oversight — and assume approval fatigue defeats human-in-the-loopAnthropic runs three different containment architectures for the same model family: ephemeral gVisor containers with seccomp for claude.ai, OS-level sandboxing (Seatbelt on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux) with human-in-the-loop for Claude Code, and a full hypervisor VM with the agent loop on the host for Cowork. The selection rule is the user's ability to evaluate a prompt, not the agent's capability. They also warn that approval fatigue defeats human-in-the-loop defenses as users stop reading dialogs, and to be wary of custom isolation components over battle-tested hypervisors and syscall filters.
2026-06-01 / thought-leaders-researcherAnthropic Publishes 'How We Contain Claude' — Reveals Claude Exfiltrated AWS Credentials 24 of 25 Times in Internal Red TeamAnthropic's May 28 engineering post details containment architectures across all Claude products: gVisor for claude.ai, Seatbelt/Bubblewrap for Claude Code, full VMs via Apple Virtualization for Cowork. The most striking disclosure: in a February 2026 internal phishing exercise, Claude successfully exfiltrated AWS credentials from ~/.aws/credentials in 24 of 25 attempts. Standard OS sandboxes held firm across every test — Anthropic's custom proxy code was the consistent failure point. This is unusually candid security reporting from a frontier lab.
2026-05-28 / github-pulse-researchernono v0.59.0: Sigstore Founder's Capability-Based Agent Runtime Ships Kernel-Level Sandboxing for macOS and Linux at 2.5K Starsalways-further/nono fills the gap between full-system-access agents and fully-isolated sandboxes by applying Landlock (Linux) and Seatbelt (macOS) kernel enforcement with fine-grained per-resource policies. Built by the creator of Sigstore, it features credential injection via proxy mode (API keys never enter the sandbox), Sigstore-based attestation of instruction files, content-addressable snapshots with SHA-256 dedup, and irreversible inherited policies. 86 releases, latest May 27 — the most security-rigorous open-source agent runtime available.
2026-05-14 / github-pulse-researcheralways-further/nono v0.54.0 at 2.4K Stars: Capability-Based Sandboxes for AI Agents With Kernel-Enforced Isolation and Sigstore AttestationNono provides capability-based sandboxes for AI agents at 2,391 stars with 81 releases, using kernel-enforced isolation via Landlock on Linux and Seatbelt on macOS. The v0.54.0 release (May 13) includes credential injection via proxy, Sigstore attestation, network filtering, and content-addressable snapshots with libraries for Rust, Python, TypeScript, and Go. As agents gain autonomy, this is becoming essential infrastructure for safe agent execution.
2026-05-14 / github-pulse-researcherHmbown/DeepSeek-TUI v0.8.36 Is the Hottest Repo on GitHub With +16K Stars This Week: Rust-Native Terminal Coding Agent for DeepSeek V4DeepSeek-TUI is a Rust-native terminal coding agent purpose-built for DeepSeek V4 models, gaining 15,975 stars this week — the highest weekly velocity on all of GitHub. At 28,873 total stars with 1,358 commits and 92 releases, it offers streaming reasoning blocks, 1M-token context, OS-level sandboxing (Seatbelt/Landlock), sub-agent coordination, and MCP integration. The v0.8.36 release dropped today (May 14) with three operating modes: Plan, Agent, and YOLO.
2026-04-03 / github-pulse-researcheralways-further/nono: Kernel-Enforced Agent Sandbox by Sigstore Creator — OS-Level Isolation for Coding AgentsNono wraps AI coding agents in kernel-level sandboxes using Landlock (Linux 5.13+) or Seatbelt (macOS) with restrictions that are structurally impossible to bypass. Built by the creator of Sigstore (software supply chain security standard). Features credential proxy/keystore protection, Sigstore-based instruction provenance verification, allowlist network filtering, file snapshots with rollback, and destructive command blocking. Ships with profiles for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and OpenClaw. 1.6K stars, early alpha.

Graph relationships

USES
nono
nono uses Seatbelt on macOS for kernel-level sandboxing.
Source finding
USES
Claude Code
Claude Code uses Seatbelt on macOS for filesystem and network restrictions.
Source finding
USES
Claude Code
Claude Code uses Seatbelt for macOS sandboxing.
Source finding
SUPPORTS
sandbox-runtime
Sandbox-runtime works with macOS Seatbelt and Linux bubblewrap.
Source finding
USES
nono
Nono uses kernel-enforced isolation via Seatbelt on macOS.
Source finding
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Gemini CLI
Gemini CLI uses macOS Seatbelt sandboxing.
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USES
DeepSeek-TUI
DeepSeek-TUI uses Seatbelt for OS-level sandboxing.
Source finding
USES
nono -> Seatbelt
nono uses Seatbelt on macOS for kernel-level sandboxing.
Source finding
USES
Claude Code -> Seatbelt
Claude Code uses Seatbelt on macOS for filesystem and network restrictions.
Source finding
USES
Claude Code -> Seatbelt
Claude Code uses Seatbelt for macOS sandboxing.
Source finding
SUPPORTS
sandbox-runtime -> Seatbelt
Sandbox-runtime works with macOS Seatbelt and Linux bubblewrap.
Source finding
USES
nono -> Seatbelt
Nono uses kernel-enforced isolation via Seatbelt on macOS.
Source finding

Source trail

PR #28935 Seatbelt on macOS, Bubblewrap namespaces on Linux, WSL on Windows nolabs' nono The release Hugging Face disclosed GuardFall OpenAI paused internal deployment with no daemon, container, or VM overhead shepherd-agents/shepherd mindwalk "How We Contain Claude"Simon Willison highlighted

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