Compose agent guardrails as an algebra instead of a rule list: 94.8% of policy-violating events intercepted while keeping 86.9% task completion
Rather than treating guardrails as a flat list of checks, this work defines a policy algebra where security profiles and runtime obligations compose through joins, intersections, budget narrowing, and approval inheritance - an agent counts as reliably capable only when its action events stay admissible under identity, profile, tool, data, memory, budget, artifact, approval, and audit constraints simultaneously. The composition operators are the useful part for builders: they let you derive a sub-agent's effective policy from its parent's rather than re-authoring one per agent, which is exactly where hand-written guardrail sets drift. Reported results are 94.8% intervention on policy-violating events with 86.9% task completion retained and 98.6% audit completeness, with formal correctness conditions and executable semantics provided.
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