LMSM Ports the Linux Security Modules Split to LLM Serving, Cutting HarmBench ASR 39.20% to 3.32% at 98.14% Throughput
Zhang et al. argue that interpretability signals become integration debt when each one ships its own calibration, policy logic, and intervention code, and adapt the LSM separation instead: a pluggable backend supplies calibrated evidence, a versioned policy evaluates rules over trusted per-request context, and a separate gate authorizes buffered output release. The prototype runs on Hugging Face Transformers and continuously batched vLLM, hosting sparse autoencoder, transcoder, and dense-probe backends on one substrate while preserving per-request decisions under scheduler churn. On Qwen3-4B it drops HarmBench attack success from 39.20% to 3.32% with XSTest false refusals rising 2.40% to 4.40%, retaining 98.14% of unmonitored throughput at 32 active sequences.
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