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Agents2026-08-29 · source-backed
The authors model strategic bidding as a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring, then run multi-agent RL over it, and build a criteria set for judging collusion that goes beyond comparing profit against Nash equilibria. Agents sustained supra-competitive outcomes matching tacit-collusion indicators despite never being instructed to collude. Clearest domain-specific evidence yet that autonomous pricing agents create a regulatory problem their operators didn't choose and can't easily disclaim. (arXiv)
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Shared entity: Multi / Same source domain / Shared topic / Earlier coverage / Tension
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (agent, author).
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (against, agent).
Shared entity: Multi / Same source domain / Shared topic / Earlier coverage / Downstream implication
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (agent, multi-agent).
Shared entity: Multi / Same source domain / Shared topic / Earlier coverage
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (against, agent, multi-agent).
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (agent, author, multi-agent).
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (agent, multi-agent).
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (agent, multi-agent).
Both cover Multi; reported by the same outlet (arxiv.org); overlapping topics (agent, multi-agent).