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Safeguard — Agent runtime network egress controls 2026

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2026-07-16

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2026-07-16 / SKILLSReplace flat egress allowlists with a signed-context proxy for agent runtimesPlain destination allowlists fail for agents in three specific ways: agents must reach arbitrary URLs from user instructions, a flat entry for `api.example.com` permits adversarially-injected requests equally with legitimate ones, and allowed destinations with free-form logged fields become covert exfiltration channels. A signed-context egress proxy instead decides on metadata signed by the runtime (not the agent) — session, initiating user, upstream context provenance, calling tool, and a recent reasoning summary. Rollout advice is to run policies in logging-only mode first and to control DNS through a resolver that scores queries for exfiltration patterns.

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