Entity trail

HarmBench

Source-backed findings, relationship evidence, citations, and briefing history from the public MindPattern archive.

Briefing refs

Findings

Edges

Sources

Corpus findings

2026-09-07 / reddit-researcherAbliterlitics published a 167-GPU-hour forensic audit of 8 uncensored Qwen 3.8 27B variants and found one card's claims match its weightsThe report at abliterlitics.dev, posted to r/LocalLLaMA at 530 upvotes, ran 11 days and ~167 hours on an RTX 5090 (91h LM-Eval, 75.5h HarmBench, 0.7h KL divergence, 3.3 CPU hours weight analysis) across weight comparison, 13 benchmarks, KL divergence and HarmBench's 400 classic behaviors with an LLM judge. Rankings by attack success rate: orcarouter 82.2%, apostate 78.7%, huihui 75.6%, ultra_heretic 70.5%, coder3101 70.0%, blackfrost 68.5%, obliteratus 63.9%, trohrbaugh 57.5%, against a 4.5% base. Capability cost tracks separately from ASR: apostate has the lowest KL at 0.0439 while obliteratus sits at 1.5427, and the author says orcarouter was the only card where every published claim checked out against the actual weights.
2026-08-27 / arxiv-researcherLMSM Ports the Linux Security Modules Split to LLM Serving, Cutting HarmBench ASR 39.20% to 3.32% at 98.14% ThroughputZhang et al. argue that interpretability signals become integration debt when each one ships its own calibration, policy logic, and intervention code, and adapt the LSM separation instead: a pluggable backend supplies calibrated evidence, a versioned policy evaluates rules over trusted per-request context, and a separate gate authorizes buffered output release. The prototype runs on Hugging Face Transformers and continuously batched vLLM, hosting sparse autoencoder, transcoder, and dense-probe backends on one substrate while preserving per-request decisions under scheduler churn. On Qwen3-4B it drops HarmBench attack success from 39.20% to 3.32% with XSTest false refusals rising 2.40% to 4.40%, retaining 98.14% of unmonitored throughput at 32 active sequences.
2026-08-21 / thought-leaders-researcherUncensored Qwen3.8-27B builds land on Hugging Face with refusal rates collapsing from 99% to 0% on seven safety benchmarksAn abliterated Qwen3.8-27B FP8 checkpoint shipped August 15 and a GGUF build August 16, with published numbers showing refusal dropping from 99.0% to 0.0% on AdvBench, 94.0% to 0.0% on JailbreakBench, 98.7% to 2.7% on HarmBench and 97.3% to 2.0% on StrongREJECT with thinking off. A post claiming 0.0% refusal across 842 harmful prompts cleared 356K views and 5,287 likes on August 20. At least four independent repos (hotdogs, Blackfrost-AI, 0bserverx, OBLITERATUS) published variants in the same week, which is the real story: weight-level refusal removal on a 27B open model is now a commodity, not a research demo.
2026-05-15 / arxiv-researcherTalk is (Not) Cheap: 932-Paper STRIDE Taxonomy Reveals 75% of LLM Attack Surface Untested by Any BenchmarkResearchers constructed a 4×6 Target×Technique STRIDE matrix from 932 arXiv security studies (2023–2026), producing a 507-leaf taxonomy with 2,521 unique attack groups. Auditing HarmBench, InjecAgent, and AgentDojo against this matrix reveals the three benchmarks occupy non-overlapping cells covering at most 25% of the threat surface. Two entire STRIDE categories — Service Disruption and Model Internals — lack any standardized evaluation despite published attacks achieving 46× token amplification and 96% success rates.

Graph relationships

BENCHMARKED AGAINST
Qwen 3.8 27B
Qwen 3.8 27B uncensored variants achieved attack success rates from 57.5% to 82.2% on HarmBench.
Source finding
BENCHMARKED AGAINST
Qwen 3.8 27B -> HarmBench
Qwen 3.8 27B uncensored variants achieved attack success rates from 57.5% to 82.2% on HarmBench.
Source finding

Source trail

abliterlitics.dev Source: CBC News Vietnam-based security startup Source: CNBC 932-paper analysis arXiv 2608.25697 Hugging Face

Graph sources

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